Logics of Imprecise Comparative Probability by Ding, Yifeng et al.
UC Berkeley
Working Papers
Title
Logics of Imprecise Comparative Probability
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1m3156ps
Authors
Ding, Yifeng
Holliday, Wesley Halcrow
Icard, Thomas Frederick, III
Publication Date
2020
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 4.0
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Logics of Imprecise Comparative Probability
Yifeng Ding†, Wesley H. Holliday†, and Thomas F. Icard, III‡
† University of California, Berkeley and ‡ Stanford University
Draft of January 1, 2020
Abstract
This paper studies connections between two alternatives to the standard probability
calculus for representing and reasoning about uncertainty: imprecise probability and
comparative probability. The goal is to identify complete logics for reasoning about
uncertainty in a comparative probabilistic language whose semantics is given in terms
of imprecise probability. Comparative probability operators are interpreted as quanti-
fying over a set of probability measures. Modal and dynamic operators are added for
reasoning about epistemic possibility and updating sets of probability measures.
Keywords: imprecise probability, comparative probability, logic and probability.
1 Introduction
While the standard probability calculus remains the dominant formal framework for repre-
senting uncertainty across numerous disciplines, a small but significant tradition in philos-
ophy, economics, computer science, and statistics has contended that the precision inherent
in assigning “sharp” probabilities to uncertain events is often inappropriate. The reasons
are several. One obvious concern is the psychological reality of arbitrarily precise real-valued
judgments (Boole 1854; Keynes 1921; Koopman 1940; Good 1962; Suppes 1974). As Sup-
pes (1974) expresses the concern, “Almost everyone who has thought about the problems
of measuring beliefs in the tradition of subjective probability or Bayesian statistical proce-
dures concedes some uneasiness with the problem of always asking for the next decimal of
accuracy in the prior estimation of a probability” (p. 160). Another quite distinct concern
is that even for a certain kind of idealized agent free of computational or representational
limitations, in many important cases the available evidence somehow underdetermines the
“right” probability function to have, and it would be epistemically unfitting to opt for any
one of them (Carnap 1936; Levi 1974; Joyce 2005; Konek Forthcoming).
A number of alternative formal frameworks have been advanced (see, e.g., Halpern 2003).
Our focus here is on two especially prominent alternatives. Some authors favor a sort of
generalization of the probability calculus, allowing uncertainty to be measured by sets of
probability functions (Good 1962; Levi 1974; Joyce 2005; Walley 1991; see Bradley 2019
for a philosophical overview). This imprecise probability framework retains many of the
benefits of standard Bayesian representation and reasoning—indeed allowing the standard
picture to emerge as a special case—while also affording a wider range of epistemic attitudes.
A second line of work renounces the demand for explicit numerical judgments altogether,
arguing that qualitative, especially comparative, judgments should be the primitive building
blocks for the theory of uncertainty (Keynes 1921; Koopman 1940; Fine 1973; Hawthorne
2016; see Konek 2019 for a philosophical overview). Aside from being intuitively simpler
and arguably closer to “ordinary” expressions of uncertainty, some authors have argued that
this setting of comparative probability is perhaps uniquely suited to solving notable epistemic
puzzles (Fine 1977; DiBella 2018; Eva Forthcoming). Others have sought more ameliorative
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reconciliations between the quantitative and qualitative approaches so as to capitalize on
the advantages of each (see, e.g., Suppes and Zanotti 1976; Elliott Forthcoming).
Our aim in this paper is neither to weigh in on the debate between precise and imprecise
versions of probabilism, nor to adjudicate between the quantitative and the qualitative
alternatives, but rather to shed light on the connections between them. Only quite recently
have even the most basic questions about such connections been clarified (R´ıos Insua 1992;
Alon and Lehrer 2014; Alon and Heifetz 2014; Harrison-Trainor et al. 2016). This is of
interest from all perspectives. If one takes sets of probability measures as primitive, it
would nevertheless be desirable to understand some of the core qualitative commitments
implicit in this representation, including how such commitments relate to those of precise
probability and other frameworks. Most conspicuously, the generalization to sets of measures
brings with it a rejection of the infamous comparability principle (also sometimes called
opinionation or totality), according to which every two events ought to be compared in
probability. Indeed, rejection of this principle has served as one of the primary arguments
against precise probabilism. As Keynes (1921) expressed it a century ago:
Is our expectation of rain, when we start out for a walk, always more likely than
not, or less likely than not, or as likely as not? I am prepared to argue that on
some occasions none of these alternatives hold, and that it will be an arbitrary
matter to decide for or against the umbrella. If the barometer is high, but the
clouds are black, it is not always rational that one should prevail over the other
in our minds, or even that we should balance them. (p. 30)
Aside from the rejection of comparability, are there other differences between the precise and
imprecise probabilistic frameworks that surface in this qualitative setting? Likewise, we can
ask about various additional qualitative notions aside from the usual “weak” comparison
‘at least as likely as’. For example, whereas the strict version of this judgment, ‘more likely
than’, is easily definable in the precise setting in terms of weak comparison, this is no longer
the case in the imprecise setting (see Section 2 below), raising new questions about the
qualitative principles characterizing this distinctive kind of unanimity operator.
If, on the other hand, one takes qualitative judgments as primitive, this has the potential
advantage of discarding principles forced upon us by (even imprecise) probabilistic represen-
tations. This may be desirable, e.g., if one is solely concerned with certain epistemic virtues
such as maximizing accuracy (Fitelson and McCarthy, 2014). At the same time, there are
also arguments that purport to show why an agent who maintains only comparative judg-
ments would not want to violate qualitative probabilistic principles (Fishburn 1986; Fitelson
and McCarthy 2014; Icard 2016). For example, suppose that we operationalize a judgment
of the form ‘A is more likely than B’ in terms of a disposition to opt for a prospect that
pays some positive dividend conditional on A over one that pays the same amount condi-
tional on B. Moreover, suppose that satisfying this preference is worth some cost, while
judgments of the form ‘A and B are equally likely’ engender no such disposition. Then one
can show that an agent will be forced into choosing strictly dominated actions (worse than
some other available option no matter how the world turns out) if and only if the agent’s
judgments fail to comport with any set of probability measures (Icard 2016). Arguments
like these highlight the importance of gaining a better understanding of what compatibility
of comparative judgments with imprecise probability means.
In the present contribution we take a logical approach, studying a sequence of increas-
ingly expressive qualitative formal systems, all interpreted over sets of probability measures.
To illustrate the type of reasoning we would like to systemize, consider this example.
Example 1.1. The following is a description of the famous “three prisoners” puzzle from
Diaconis (1978) (see also Diaconis and Zabell 1986; Halpern 2003, § 3.3):
Of three prisoners a, b, and c, two are to be executed, but a does not know
which. He therefore says to the jailer, “Since either b or c is certainly going to
be executed, you will give me no information about my own chances if you give
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me the name of one man, either b or c, who is going to be executed.” Accepting
this argument, the jailer truthfully replies, “b will be executed.” Thereupon a
feels happier because before the jailer replied, his own chance of execution was
two-thirds, but afterward there are only two people, himself and c, who could
be the one not executed, and so his chance of execution is one-half. (Diaconis
and Zabell, 1986, p. 30)
Under what conditions could a’s reasoning possibly be sound? Imagine there are four
relevant ways the world could be: wab, wac, wbc, wcb, where in wij prisoner i is the one who
lives and prisoner j is the one who the jailer says will be executed. Assuming that each
prisoner is equally likely to be spared, we can assume wbc and wcb both have probability
one-third, and the disjunction “wab or wac” has probability one-third: prisoner a assumes
that they also have a one-third chance. Concerning the relative probability of wab and wac,
we could apply a principle of indifference and proclaim that the jailer is equally likely to
announce b or announce c, in case a is the one to be spared. It is then easy to compute
that the conditional probability of being spared after learning that b will be executed (and
thus wac and wbc can be eliminated as possibilities) is still one-third. In this case a learns
nothing from the jailer’s announcement.
By contrast, if for whatever reason a thinks the jailer is certain to tell him it is b who will
be executed when a is the one to be spared, then learning b will be executed does rationally
lead a to conclude that he now has a one-half chance of survival.
There is an intuition in this scenario that the right way to respond to the evidence
is to leave the relatively likelihood of wab and wac open: to represent a’s uncertainty in
terms of the set of all probability measures that assign one-third to each wbc, wcb, and the
disjunction “wab or wac.” In this case the probabilities of wab and wac each range from zero
to one-third, under the constraint that their sum is one-third. Updating each such measure
by eliminating wac and wbc results in a range of posterior probability values for a surviving,
from zero to one-half. Thus, the probability that a is spared (the disjunction “wab or wac”)
has dilated (Walley, 1991) from precisely one-third to the entire interval [0, 1/2].
Example 1.1 illustrates some of the intriguing subtleties in imprecise probabilistic rea-
soning, subtleties that surface already in a purely qualitative setting. By the end of this
paper, we will be able to formalize Example 1.1 in a dynamic logic of updating imprecise
comparative probability (Example 6.4).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we consider the pure order-theoretic
setting of comparative probability and prove a representation theorem extending previous
results in the literature. The theorem concerns both a weak and a strict comparative
relation together represented by a set of probability measures (Theorem 2.7). In Section 3,
we turn to the logical setting and review some completeness theorems for logics of precise and
imprecise probability with a single weak comparative relation (Theorems 3.7, 3.9), as well as
alternative interpretations of these systems (Theorems 3.10, 3.11). In Section 4, we consider
a logical language that includes both weak and strict comparative relations and, using the
representation Theorem 2.7, prove a corresponding completeness theorem (Theorem 4.4).
Section 5 explores the addition of a primitive “possibility” operator asserting the existence of
a probability measure with a given property, culminating again in a complete axiomatization
(Theorem 5.7). Finally, in Section 6 we add a dynamic operator to the language, allowing
the formalization of basic comparative conditional probabilities, and we prove that the
extended language is in fact no more expressive than the previous system from Section 5:
this language can be completely axiomatized by a set of “reduction axioms” (Theorem 6.7).
What emerges is a landscape of increasingly expressive logical systems, consistent with
both precise and imprecise probabilistic representations, simple but sufficiently powerful to
model sophisticated reasoning about uncertainty. Perhaps surprisingly, the computational
complexity of reasoning (e.g., determining validity or consistency) in each of the “static”
systems is no worse than for the classical propositional calculus. The complexity of reasoning
in the dynamic logic of updating sets of probability measures is an open problem.
3
2 Representation
Before introducing any explicit logical calculus, in this section we consider the pure order-
theoretic setting of comparative probability. A comparative notion of probability is most
naturally formalized as a binary relation on an algebra of events. However, not all binary
relations can be intuitively interpreted as comparing how likely events are, just as not
all functions from events to [0, 1] can be interpreted as assigning quantitative probabilities.
Taking the usual axiomatization of quantitative probability for granted, a natural question—
posed early on by de Finetti (1949)—is what would be a set of axioms that are intuitive
and in harmony with those quantitative axioms.
This question was first solved for finite event algebras in Kraft et al. (1959). Given a
binary relation % on ℘(W ), where W is a finite set, and a probability measure µ on ℘(W ),
we say that % is precisely represented by µ if for all X,Y ⊆W , X % Y iff µ(X) ≥ µ(Y ).
Theorem 2.1 (Kraft et al. 1959). Let W be an arbitrary finite set and % a binary relation
on ℘(W ). Then % is precisely represented by some probability measure on ℘(W ) if and
only if:
• ∅ 6%W , {w} % ∅ for all w ∈W , and for all A,B ∈ ℘(W ), A % B or B % A, and
• % satisfies the finite cancellation condition (FC): letting 1X denote the characteristic
function of X, for any two finite sequences 〈Ai〉ni=1, 〈Bi〉ni=1 of events in ℘(W ) such
that
∑n
i=1 1Ai =
∑n
i=1 1Bi (additions are done in the vector space RW ), if for all
i < n, Ai % Bi, then Bn % An.
Following the same paradigm, we can consider a comparative notion of imprecise prob-
ability and ask the following question: which binary relations on a finite algebra of events
can be naturally interpreted as an imprecise version of the at-least-as-likely-as relation?
More precisely, given a binary relation % on ℘(W ), where W is a finite set, and a set P of
probability measures on ℘(W ), we say that % is imprecisely represented as the weak relation
by P if for all X,Y ⊆W , X % Y iff for all µ ∈ P, µ(X) ≥ µ(Y ). The following analogue of
Theorem 2.1 was proved by R´ıos Insua (1992) (also see Alon and Lehrer 2014).
Theorem 2.2 (R´ıos Insua 1992). Let W be an arbitrary finite set and % a binary relation on
℘(W ). Then % is imprecisely represented as the weak relation by some set P of probability
measures on ℘(W ) if and only if:
• ∅ 6%W , {w} % ∅ for all w ∈W , and
• % satisfies the generalized finite cancellation condition (GFC): for any two finite se-
quences 〈Ai〉ni=1, 〈Bi〉ni=1 of events in ℘(W ) and k ∈ N \ {0} such that
∑n−1
i=1 1Ai +
k1An =
∑n−1
i=1 1Bi + k1Bn , if for all i < n, Ai % Bi, then Bn % An. (Note that n can
be 1, in which case the condition simply expresses the reflexivity of %.)
Remark 2.3. Harrison-Trainor et al. (2016) prove that there are relations % satisfying the
conditions of Theorem 2.1 except for the comparability principle (that for all A,B ∈ ℘(W ),
A % B or B % A) and which fail to satisfy the GFC condition in Theorem 2.2. Thus, it is
necessary to strengthen FC to GFC when dropping comparability to obtain Theorem 2.2.
A subtlety not covered by Theorem 2.2 is that given a set P of probability measures,
there are two natural ways to generate a strict relation, corresponding to the weak and the
strict dominance relation in game theory:
• X strictly dominates Y in P iff for all µ ∈ P, µ(X) > µ(Y );
• X weakly dominates Y in P iff for all µ ∈ P, µ(X) ≥ µ(Y ), and there is a µ ∈ P such
that µ(X) > µ(Y ).
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When % is represented as the weak relation by P, it is easy to see that X % Y iff X is
not weakly dominated by Y . However, we cannot pin down the strict dominance relation
simply from the weak relation or vice versa, as shown by the following example.
Example 2.4. Let W = {w, v} and consider the four binary relations %1,%2,1,2 pic-
tured as below from left to right (for dashed arrows, reflexive and transitive arrows are
omitted; for solid arrows, transitive arrows are omitted).
∅
{w} {v}
W
%1 ∅
{w} {v}
W
%2 ∅
{w} {v}
W
1 ∅
{w} {v}
W
2
If the only thing we know about a set P of probability measures on ℘(W ) is that its weak
relation is %1, then both 1 and 2 may be P’s strict dominance relation. For example,
we can define a probability measure µw<v on ℘(W ) that favors v so that µw<v({w}) = 1/3.
Then let µw=v be the uniform distribution on ℘(W ): µw=v({w}) = µw=v({v}) = 1/2. Then
for both {µw<v, µw=v} and {µw<v}, their weak relation is %1. Yet the strict dominance
relation of the former is 1 while the strict dominance relation of the latter is 2.
Similarly, if the only thing we know about P is that its strict dominance relation is 1,
then both %1 and %2 may be its weak relation. For this, define a probability measure µw>v
that favors w so that µw>v({w}) = 2/3. Then we see that the strict dominance relation of
both {µw<v, µw=v} and {µw<v, µw>v} is 1 while the weak relation of the former is %1 and
the weak relation of the latter is %2.
In light of these considerations, we introduce the following definition that accounts for
both relations; cf. Konek (2019, p. 275, footnote 4), who suggests that the study of compar-
ative probability ought to start with pairs 〈%,〉 because an agent who judges that X is at
least as likely as Y but withholds judgment about whether Y is at least as likely as X does
not necessarily judge that X is strictly more likely than Y .
Definition 2.5. Given a pair 〈%,〉 of binary relations on ℘(W ) and a set P of probability
measures on ℘(W ), we say that 〈%,〉 is represented by P iff for all X,Y ⊆W ,
• X % Y iff for all µ ∈ P, µ(X) ≥ µ(Y ), and
• X  Y iff for all µ ∈ P, µ(X) > µ(Y ).
Remark 2.6. Define X < Y as not Y  X, i.e., there is some µ ∈ P such that µ(X) ≥ µ(Y )
(cf. the notion of justifiable preference in Lehrer and Teper 2011). Then the pair 〈%,<〉 of
weak relations is what Giarlotta and Greco (2013) call a necessary and possible preference.
The following theorem characterizes the representable relation pairs.
Theorem 2.7. Let W be a finite set and %, two binary relations on ℘(W ). Then 〈%,〉
is represented by a set P of probability measures on ℘(W ) if and only if:
•  is irreflexive and  ⊆ %;
• W  ∅, and {w} % ∅ for all w ∈W ;
• % satisfies (GFC) and  satisfies the strict generalized finite cancellation condition
(SGFC): for any two finite sequences 〈Ai〉ni=1, 〈Bi〉ni=1 of events in ℘(W ) and k ∈ N\{0}
such that
∑n−1
i=1 1Ai + k1An =
∑n−1
i=1 1Bi + k1Bn , if for all i < n, Ai % Bi and there
is i < n with Ai  Bi, then Bn  An.
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The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.7. The proof is adapted
from the proof in Alon and Lehrer 2014, which also generalizes the proof in Scott 1964 for
Theorem 2.1 (also see Mierzewski 2018, § 3.3 for a representation theorem concerning 〈%,〉
in the setting of precise probability). For this, pick an arbitrary finite set W and a pair
〈%,〉 satisfying the conditions (the necessity of the conditions is easy). The main strategy
is to reframe the representability of 〈%,〉 in terms of the existence of solutions to some
systems of homogeneous linear inequalities in the vector space RW . Hence we use vectors
in ∆(W ) = {µ ∈ RW | µ · 1W = 1 and for all w ∈W, µ(w) ≥ 0} as probability measures.
Define D% = {1A − 1B | A,B ⊆ W, A % B} and D = {1A − 1B | A,B ⊆ W, A  B}.
Intuitively, D% contains vectors that always receive non-negative measures and D contains
vectors that always receive positive measures. Given the conditions satisfied by % and ,
we can prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.8. If f ∈ {−1, 0, 1}W is a non-negative linear combination of vectors in D%, then
f ∈ D%.
Proof. Suppose f ∈ {−1, 0, 1}W is a non-negative linear combination of vectors in D%.
Since all the vectors are in {−1, 0, 1}W , we can assume that all coefficients are rational since
a system of linear inequalities with rational coefficients has a solution if and only if it has a
rational solution. Then we can clear the denominators and obtain a k ∈ N \ {0} such that
kf is simply a sum of vectors in D% possibly with repeatitions:
∑n
i=1 gi. Since f and the
gi’s are in D%, we can find subsets Ai, Bi for i = 1 . . . n+ 1 of W such that
• gi = 1Ai − 1Bi for i = 1 . . . n and f = 1Bn+1 − 1An+1 (take Bn+1 = f−1(1) and
An+1 = f
−1(−1)), and
• Ai % Bi for i = 1 . . . n.
Then given that kf =
∑n
i=1 gi, we have
∑n
n=1 1Ai + k1An+1 =
∑n
i=1 1Bi + k1Bn+1 . Hence
we can apply (GFC) to 〈Ai〉n+1i=1 and 〈Bi〉n+1i=1 and see that Bn+1 % An+1. Therefore,
f = 1Bn+1 − 1An+1 ∈ D%.
Lemma 2.9. If f ∈ {−1, 0, 1}W is a non-negative linear combination of vectors in D%∪D
with a coefficient for a vector in D being positive, then f ∈ D.
Proof. Similar to the proof of the previous lemma. The only change in this case is that
when we find k and express kf as a sum of vectors in D% ∪D, at least one vector in D
must figure in the sum since initially the non-negative linear combination resulting in f has
a positive coefficient for a vector in D. Then we can find sets Ai’s and Bi’s similarly and
apply (SGFC) to see that f must be in D already.
Now define
P = {µ ∈ ∆(W ) | ∀f ∈ D%, µ · f ≥ 0 and ∀f ∈ D, µ · f > 0}.
Our goal is to show that 〈%,〉 is represented by this P. Note that one direction is done
already: for any A,B ⊆W ,
• if A % B, then by the definition of P, for all µ ∈ P, µ · (1A − 1B) ≥ 0, which means
that µ · 1A ≥ µ · 1B ;
• similarly, if A  B, then for all µ ∈ P, µ · (1A − 1B) > 0, which means that µ · 1A >
µ · 1B .
Hence all that are left to prove are the following two claims:
(a) If A 6% B, then there is a µ ∈ P such that µ · (1A − 1B) < 0;
(b) If A 6 B, then there is a µ ∈ P such that µ · (1A − 1B) ≤ 0.
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For (a), it is enough to prove that for all f ∈ {−1, 0, 1}W , if f 6∈ D%, then there is µ ∈ P
such that µ · −f > 0, since for any A,B ⊆W , we have 1A − 1B ∈ {−1, 0, 1}W . Hence take
such an f ∈ {−1, 0, 1}W \D%. We need to find a µ such that (i) µ ∈ P and (ii) µ · −f > 0.
Given the definition of P, this amounts to the existence of a solution to the following system
of homogeneous linear inequalities (where we write [D] for the matrix containing as columns
the vectors in a set D of vectors):
[D%]
>~x ≥ ~0, [D ∪ {−f}]>~x > ~0. (1)
The existence of a µ satisfiying (i) and (ii) is equivalent to the existence of a solution to the
above system of inequalities because by assumption, W  ∅ and {w} % ∅ for all w ∈ W ,
which means that 1W ∈ D and 1{w} ∈ D% for all w ∈W , so any solution can be scaled to
be an element in P. The condition of the existence of a solution is given by a special case
of Motzkin’s Transposition Theorem (see Motzkin 1951).
Theorem 2.10 (Motzkin’s Transposition Theorem). The linear inequality system M1~x ≥
0,M2~x > ~0 has a solution if and only if there is no solution to the system M
>
1 ~y1 +M
>
2 ~y2 =
~0, ~y1 ≥ ~0, ~y2 ≥ ~0, ~y2 6= ~0.
Suppose toward a contradiction that there is no solution to (1). Then by Motzkin’s
Transposition Theorem, there are non-negative ~y1, ~y2 with ~y2 non-trivial such that [D%]>~y1+
[D ∪ {−f}]> ~y2 = ~0. In other words, ~0 is a non-negative linear combination of vectors in
D% ∪D ∪ {−f} with one of the vectors in D ∪ {−f} having a positive coefficient. Now
there are two possibilities: either −f has a positive coefficient or not. If not, then ~0 is
a non-negative linear combination of vectors in D% ∪ D with a vector in D having a
positive coefficient. Then, by Lemma 2.9, ~0 ∈ D. This contradicts the assumption that
 is irreflexive. If −f has a positive coefficient, then f is a linear combination of vectors
in D% ∪D = D% since ⊆%. By Lemma 2.8, f ∈ D%, but we picked f specifically from
outside D%. Hence, either way, we have a contradiction. This completes the proof of (a).
The proof of (b) is almost identical. It is enough to show that for any f ∈ {−1, 0, 1}W \
D, the following has a solution:
[D% ∪ {−f}]>~x ≥ ~0, [D]>~x > ~0.
If there is no solution, then by Motzkin’s Transposition Theorem, ~0 is a non-negative linear
combination of vectors in D% ∪{−f}∪D with at least one vector in D having a positive
coefficient. Again, we consider whether −f has a positive coefficient or not. If not, then ~0
should again be in D, which is not the case. If indeed −f has a positive coefficient, then
f is a linear combination of vectors in D% ∪ D with at least one vector in D having a
positive coefficient. By Lemma 2.9, f ∈ D, contradicting the way we picked f . Hence (b)
is also proved, which completes the proof of Theorem 2.7.
3 The Logic IP(%)
In this section and the following sections, we turn to the formalization of imprecise com-
parative probabilistic reasoning in logical systems. The representation theorems of Section
2 lead to completeness theorems for these logical systems.
The logics we consider form a hierarchy of increasing expressive power of their languages.
The least expressive language we will consider is the following.
Definition 3.1. The language L(%), generated from a nonempty set Prop of propositional
variables, is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ % ϕ)
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where p ∈ Prop. A propositional formula is a formula generated from Prop using only ¬ and
∧. We define the other propositional connectives ∨, →, and ↔ as usual. Finally, we define
ϕ  ψ as (ϕ % ψ) ∧ ¬(ψ % ϕ) and ϕ ≈ ψ as (ϕ % ψ) ∧ (ψ % ϕ).
We will consider several semantics for this language, each of which builds on the standard
possible world models for propositional logics.
Definition 3.2. A propositional model is a pair M = 〈W,V 〉 where W is a nonempty set
and V : Prop→ ℘(W ). We may abuse notation and write ‘w ∈M’ to mean w ∈W .
The first semantics for L(%) that we will consider, which may be considered its “intended
semantics,” equips a propositional model with one or more probability measures, as follows.
Definition 3.3. An imprecise probabilistic model (IP model) is a pair 〈M,P〉 where M =
〈W,V 〉 is a propositional model and P is a set of finitely additive probability measures on
an algebra F of subsets of W such that V (p) ∈ F for each p ∈ Prop. A precise probabilistic
model is an imprecise probabilistic model 〈M,P〉 such that |P| = 1.
The key part of the truth definition of formulas of L(%) in IP models matches the notion
of imprecise representation from Section 2: ϕ % ψ is true just in case according to all the
probability measures in P, the probability of the set of worlds where ϕ is true is at least as
great as the probability of the set of worlds where ψ is true.
Definition 3.4. Given an IP model 〈M,P〉, w ∈M, and ϕ ∈ L(%), we defineM,P, w  ϕ
and JϕKM,P = {w ∈W | M,P, w  ϕ} as follows:
1. M,P, w  p iff w ∈ V (p);
2. M,P, w  ¬ϕ iff M,P, w 2 ϕ;
3. M,P, w  (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff M,P, w  ϕ and M,P, w  ψ;
4. M,P, w  ϕ % ψ iff for all µ ∈ P, µ(JϕKM,P) ≥ µ(JψKM,P).
If α is a propositional formula, we may write ‘V (α)’ for JαKM,P to emphasize that the set
of worlds where α is true does not depend on the set P of probability measures.
Finally, given a class K of IP models, ϕ is valid with respect to K iff for all 〈M,P〉 ∈ K
and w ∈M, we have M,P, w  ϕ.
An easy induction shows that for any formula ϕ, the set of worlds where ϕ is true belongs
to the algebra F of measurable sets.
Lemma 3.5. For every IP model 〈M,P〉 and ϕ ∈ L(%), we have JϕKM,P ∈ F .
Below we define logics that are sound and complete with respect to the classes of impre-
cise probabilistic models and precise probabilistic models, respectively. To do so, we first
need to define a syntactic abbreviation that allows us to express the finite cancellation condi-
tion of Theorem 2.1 using formulas of our language. Given formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈
L(%), and 1 ≤ k ≤ n, define Ck to be the disjunction of all conjunctions
f1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ fnϕn ∧ g1ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ gnψn
where exactly k of the f ’s and k of the g’s are the empty string, and the rest are ¬. Thus,
Ck is true at a state w ∈W iff exactly k of the ϕ’s and k of the ψ’s are true at w. Then let
(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ≡ (ψ1, . . . , ψn) := C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn,
which is true at a state w ∈ W iff the number of ϕ’s true at w is exactly the same as the
number of ψ’s true at w. Using these abbreviations, we can express the finite cancellation
condition with the axiom schema (A4) below.
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Definition 3.6. The set of theorems of SP(%) (the logic of sharp probability) is the smallest
subset of L(%) that contains all tautologies of propositional logic, is closed under modus
ponens (if ϕ ∈ SP(%) and ϕ→ ψ ∈ SP(%), then ψ ∈ SP(%)) and necessitation (if ϕ ∈ SP(%),
then ϕ % > ∈ SP(%)), and contains all instances of the following axiom schemas for all
n ∈ N:1
(A0) (ϕ % ψ) ∨ (ψ % ψ);
(A1) ϕ % ⊥;
(A2) ϕ % ϕ;2
(A3) ¬(⊥ % >);
(A4)
(
(ϕ1 % ψ1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ϕn % ψn) ∧ (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ϕ′) ≡ (ψ1, . . . , ψn, ψ′) % >
)→ (ψ′ % ϕ′);
(A5) (ϕ % ψ)→ ((ϕ % ψ) % >);
(A6) ¬(ϕ % ψ)→ (¬(ϕ % ψ) % >).
The representation result in Theorem 2.1 may be used to prove the following complete-
ness theorem for SP(%).
Theorem 3.7 (Segerberg 1971; Ga¨rdenfors 1975). For all ϕ ∈ L(%): ϕ is a theorem of
SP(%) if and only if ϕ is valid with respect to the class of all precise probabilistic models.
To obtain a complete logic for imprecise probabilistic models, we express the generalized
finite cancellation conditions of Theorem 2.2 using formulas of our language as follows.
Definition 3.8. The logic IP(%) (the logic of imprecise probability) is defined in the same
way as SP(%) except without axiom (A0) and with (A4) replaced by:
(A4′)
(
(ϕ1 % ψ1)∧ · · · ∧ (ϕn % ψn)∧ (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ϕ′, . . . , ϕ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
) ≡ (ψ1, . . . , ψn, ψ′, . . . , ψ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
) % >)
→ (ψ′ % ϕ′).
The representation result in Theorem 2.2 may be used to prove the following complete-
ness theorem for IP(%).
Theorem 3.9 (Alon and Heifetz 2014). For all ϕ ∈ L(%): ϕ is a theorem of IP(%) if and
only if ϕ is valid with respect to the class of all imprecise probabilistic models.
In Section 4 we will give a completeness proof that shows how the proof of Theorem 3.9
goes as well.
Finally, we mention two non-numerical semantics for the logics SP(%) and IP(%), re-
spectively. First, van der Hoek (1996) proved that SP(%) is also the logic of cardinality
comparisons between finite sets (for the logic of cardinality comparisons between sets of
arbitrary cardinality, see Ding et al. Forthcoming).
Theorem 3.10 (van der Hoek 1996). The logic SP(%) is also sound and complete with
respect to finite propositional models M = 〈W,V 〉 with the semantics
M,w  ϕ % ψ iff ∃ an injection f : JψKM → JϕKM .
To obtain a non-numerical semantics for IP(%), Holliday and Icard (2013) use preferential
models M = (W,, V ) where  is a preorder (a reflexive and transitive binary relation)
on W . Intuitively,  is a likelihood relation on worlds, which is then lifted to a likelihood
relation on events as in the following theorem (also see Harrison-Trainor et al. 2018).
1The labeling of axioms here follows Alon and Heifetz 2014.
2Axiom (A2) is redundant given (A0), but below we consider a logic that drops (A0). In fact, (A2) is
also derivable from the n = 0 case of (A4) and (A4′), but we include (A2) to match Alon and Heifetz 2014.
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Theorem 3.11 (Harrison-Trainor et al. 2017). The logic IP(%) is also sound and complete
with respect to finite preferential models M = (W,, V ) with the semantics
M,w  ϕ % ψ iff ∃ a -inflationary injection f : JψKM → JϕKM ,
where f is -inflationary if f(w)  w for each w ∈ dom(f).
For a discussion of conceptual issues in the choice of numerical vs. non-numerical seman-
tics for IP(%) in the context of natural language semantics, see Holliday and Icard 2013 and
Section 3.4 of Holliday and Icard 2018.
4 The Logic IP(%,)
Our first step beyond the existing literature on logics of imprecise comparative probability
is to add to our formal language the primitive strict operator  from Section 2.
Definition 4.1. The language L(%,) is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ % ϕ) | (ϕ  ϕ)
where p ∈ Prop. As before, we define ϕ  ψ as (ϕ % ψ) ∧ ¬(ψ % ϕ). Let L() be the
fragment of L(%,) in which % does not occur.
Definition 4.2. We extend the semantics of Definition 3.4 to L(%,) as follows:
• M,P, w  ϕ  ψ iff for all µ ∈ P, µ(JϕKM,P) > µ(JψKM,P).
It follows from Example 2.4 that the formula p  q is not equivalent to any formula of
L(%), include p  q, while the formula p % q is not equivalent to any formula of L().
We now define a logic for L(%,) whose axioms match the conditions of the represen-
tation result in Theorem 2.7.
Definition 4.3. The logic IP(%,) is the smallest subset of L(%,) that contains all
tautologies of propositional logic, is closed under modus ponens (if ϕ ∈ IP(%,) and ϕ →
ψ ∈ IP(%,), then ψ ∈ IP(%,)) and necessitation (if ϕ ∈ IP(%,), then ϕ % > ∈
IP(%,)), and contains all instances of the following axiom schemas for all n ∈ N:
(B1) ϕ % ⊥;
(B2) >  ⊥;
(B3) (ϕ  ψ)→ (ϕ % ψ);
(B4) ¬(ϕ  ϕ);
(B5)
(
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ϕ
′, . . . , ϕ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
) ≡ (ψ1, . . . , ψn, ψ′, . . . , ψ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
) % >)→(
(
∧n
i=1(ϕi % ψi))→ (ψ′ % ϕ′)
)
;
(B6)
(
(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ϕ
′, . . . , ϕ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
) ≡ (ψ1, . . . , ψn, ψ′, . . . , ψ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
) % >)→(
(
∧n
i=1(ϕi % ψi) ∧
∨n
i=1(ϕi  ψi))→ (ψ′  ϕ′)
)
;
(B7) (ϕ % ψ)→ ((ϕ % ψ) % >);
(B8) ¬(ϕ % ψ)→ (¬(ϕ % ψ) % >);
(B9) (ϕ  ψ)→ ((ϕ  ψ) % >);
(B10) ¬(ϕ  ψ)→ (¬(ϕ  ψ) % >).
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The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4 (Soundness and Completeness). For all ϕ ∈ L(%,): ϕ is a theorem of
IP(%,) if and only if ϕ is valid with respect to the class of all imprecise probabilistic
models.
The soundness direction is easy to check. For completeness, as usual, pick an arbitrary
formula γ consistent in IP(%,) and then let p be the set of propositional variables appearing
in γ and L0 the restriction of L(%,) to p. Then extend {γ} to a set Γ that is maximally
consistent in IP(%,) with respect to L0. Now our goal is to build an IP model of γ by
extracting information from Γ. To this end, we view L0 as a term algebra of the type of
Boolean algebras expanded with two binary operations. Then define ϕ by ϕ ∧ (ϕ % >),
F = {ϕ ∈ L0 | ϕ ∈ Γ}, and a binary relation ∼ on L0 by ϕ ∼ ψ iff (ϕ↔ ψ) ∈ F .
Lemma 4.5. F contains > and is closed under deduction in L0: whenever ϕ → ψ ∈ L0
is a theorem of IP(%,) and ϕ ∈ F , then ψ ∈ F too. Also, ∼ is an equivalence relation
extending the provable equivalence relation on L0 and is congruential over ¬,∧,%, and :
for all ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ L0, if ϕ ∼ ψ, then ¬ϕ ∼ ¬ψ, (ϕ ∧ χ) ∼ (ψ ∧ χ), (χ ∧ ϕ) ∼ (χ ∧ ψ),
(ϕ % χ) ∼ (ψ % χ), (χ % ϕ) ∼ (χ % ψ), (ϕ  χ) ∼ (ψ  χ), and (χ  ϕ) ∼ (χ  ψ).
Proof. When n = 0, (B5) together with necessitation show that for every ϕ, ϕ % ϕ is a
theorem. Then clearly > ∈ F . To show that F is closed under deduction in L0, noting that
Γ is clearly closed under deduction in L0 due to its being a maximally consistent set, it is
enough to show that whenever ϕ→ ψ ∈ IP(%,), we have (ϕ % >)→ (ψ % >) ∈ IP(%,)
too. For this, apply (B5) to 〈ϕ,ψ ∧ ¬ϕ,>〉 and 〈>,⊥, ψ〉.
Since F is closed under deduction in L0 and contains >, F also contains all theorems
of IP(%,) in L0. Hence it is easy to show that ∼ is an equivalence relation extending the
provable equivalence relation on L0 that is congruential over ¬ and ∧. To show that ∼ is
congruential over % and , using again that Γ is closed under deduction in L0, we only need
to show that the following are derivable:
• ((ϕ↔ ψ) % >)→ ((ϕ % χ)↔ (ψ % χ));
• ((ϕ↔ ψ) % >)→ (((ϕ % χ)↔ (ψ % χ)) % >);
• ((ϕ↔ ψ) % >)→ ((ϕ  χ)↔ (ψ  χ));
• ((ϕ↔ ψ) % >)→ (((ϕ  χ)↔ (ψ  χ)) % >).
In fact, the second and the fourth follow from the first and the third using (B7) to (B10),
the closure of (· % >) under deduction, and Boolean reasoning. The first and the third are
again simple exercises using (B5) and (B6), respectively.
Lemma 4.6. B = L0/∼ is a Boolean algebra expanded with two binary operations which
we denote again by % and . Moreover, by axioms (B7) to (B10), for any a, b ∈ B, a % b
is either the top element or the bottom element, and so is a  b. In addition, B is finite.
Proof. Since ∼ is a congruence extending the provable equivalence relation and IP(%,)
has all Boolean reasoning principles, B is a Boolean algebra. To see that a % b is either the
top element or the bottom element, pick any ϕ,ψ ∈ L0 such that [ϕ]∼ = a and [ψ]∼ = b.
Then note that either ϕ % ψ ∈ Γ or ¬(ϕ % ψ) ∈ Γ. In the former case, given (B7), we have
(ϕ % ψ) ∈ F and hence a % b = [ϕ % ψ]∼ is the top element. In the latter case, using (B8),
¬(a % b) is the top element, which means that a % b is the bottom element. The same
reasoning goes for a  b, using (B9) and (B10). Finally, to see that B is finite, note first
that it has a finite set of generators: [p]∼ = {[p]∼ | p ∈ p}. Since we have just shown that %
and  only bring elements to either the top element or the bottom element, in generating
B from [p]∼ we can use only the Boolean operations. Hence the Boolean reduct of B is a
finitely generated Boolean algebra, which must be finite.
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Since (the Boolean reduct of) B is a finite Boolean algebra, it is isomorphic to the
powerset algebra of its set of atoms. However, to facilitate the proof of the completeness
theorem of the next section, we take the set that includes all possible truth-assignments of
propositional variables in p.
Definition 4.7. Let Wp = {0, 1}p and Vp : Prop→ ℘(W ) be the natural valuation function
defined by Vp(p) = {f ∈ W | f(p) = 1} when p ∈ p and Vp(p) = ∅ when p 6∈ p. Finally, let
Mp = 〈Wp, Vp〉.
In this way, ℘(Wp) is essentially the free Boolean algebra generated be the images of p
under Vp. The difference between ℘(Wp) and the Boolean reduct of B is that B might be
missing some of the atoms in the sense that some truth-assignments to p may be inconsistent
in B. However, from the probabilistic point of view, it is enough to make them impossible
probabilistically by assigning them 0 probability. This gives us the advantage of always
using the same Mp when satisfying any consistent subset of L0.
To connect Mp to B, first let pi be the natural Boolean quotient map pi from ℘(Wp) to
B0 such that pi(Vp(p)) = [p]∼. This map is uniquely given since ℘(Wp) is the free Boolean
algebra generated by {V (p) | p ∈ p} and B is generated by {[p]∼ | p ∈ p} using Boolean
operations. Then, on ℘(Wp), we define two binary relations:
• X %Γ Y iff pi(X) % pi(Y ) is the top element of B;
• X Γ Y iff pi(X)  pi(Y ) is the top element of B.
Then it is not hard to show the following using the axioms (B1) to (B6).
Lemma 4.8. 〈%Γ,Γ〉 satisfies all the conditions required in Theorem 2.7.
Proof. Note that for every a ∈ B, a = [ϕ]∼ for some ϕ ∈ L0. Hence any quantification over
B, and by the quotient map pi, any quantification over ℘(Wp) as well, can be simulated by
quantification over L0. Since the axioms are schematic, (B1) to (B4) directly translate the
first two bullet points of Theorem 2.7.
For (GFC) and (SGFC), it is enough to note that for any two finite sequences 〈Ai〉ni=1
and 〈Bi〉ni=1 of sets in ℘(Wp) such that
∑n
i=1 1Ai =
∑n
i=1 1Bi , we can find two sequences
〈ϕi〉ni=1 and 〈ψi〉ni=1 of formulas in L0 such that:
• for all i = 1 . . . n, we have [ϕi]∼ = pi(Ai) and [ψi]∼ = pi(Bi), which implies that
Ai %Γ Bi iff ϕi % ψi ∈ Γ and that Ai Γ Bi iff ϕi  ψi ∈ Γ;
• [(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ≡ (ψi, . . . , ψn)]∼ = [>]∼ and hence (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ≡ (ψi, . . . , ψn) ∈ F ,
which in turn implies that ((ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ≡ (ψi, . . . , ψn) % >) ∈ Γ.
The existence of these formulas means that we can use (B5) and (B6) to show (GFC) and
(SGFC), respectively.
Hence, by Theorem 2.7, we obtain a set PΓ of probability measures on ℘(Wp) such that
• X %Γ Y iff for all µ ∈ PΓ, µ(X) ≥ µ(Y ), and
• X Γ Y iff for all µ ∈ PΓ, µ(X) > µ(Y ).
From this, we can show the following truth lemma.
Lemma 4.9. For all ϕ ∈ L0, pi(JϕK〈Mp,PΓ〉) = [ϕ]∼.
Proof. By a simple induction on L0. The only cases of interest are the inductive steps for
% and . Note that Jϕ % ψK〈Mp,PΓ〉 is either Wp or ∅. Similarly, we have shown that
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[ϕ % ψ]∼ is either [>]∼ or [⊥]∼. Then the only missing connection is the following:
Jϕ % ψK〈Mp,PΓ〉 = Wp ⇐⇒ ∀µ ∈ PΓ, µ(JϕK〈Mp,PΓ〉) ≥ µ(JψK〈Mp,PΓ〉)
⇐⇒ JϕK〈Mp,PΓ〉 %Γ JψK〈Mp,PΓ〉
⇐⇒ (pi(JϕK〈Mp,PΓ〉) % pi(JψK〈Mp,PΓ〉)) = [>]∼
⇐⇒ ([ϕ]∼ % [ψ]∼) = [>]∼
⇐⇒ [ϕ % ψ]∼ = [>]∼.
The proof for the case with ϕ  ψ is almost identical.
Now note that [γ]∼ is not the bottom element in B, since otherwise [¬γ]∼ would be
the top element, and then ¬γ ∈ Γ, which means ¬γ ∈ Γ too, rendering Γ inconsistent.
Hence JγK〈Mp,PΓ〉 is nonempty because pi(∅) must be [⊥]∼ which is not [γ]∼. Take a w ∈JγK〈Mp,PΓ〉. Then 〈Mp,PΓ〉, w  γ, and we are done. To sum up, we now have the following
strengthening of the completeness theorem.
Proposition 4.10. For any finite subset p of Prop with L0 being the set of formulas in
L(%,) using only the propositional variables in p, and for any Γ ⊆ L0 that is consistent
relative to IP(%,), there is a set of probability measures PΓ on ℘(Wp) and a w ∈Wp such
that Mp,PΓ, w  γ for all γ ∈ Γ.
Finally, we comment on the logic of precise probabilistic models. While  is not definable
in L(%,) with respect to all IP models, with respect to precise probabilistic models, ϕ  ψ
can be defined simply by ¬(ψ % ψ). Hence we can define the logic SP(%,) as follows.
Definition 4.11. The logic SP(%,) is the smallest subset of L(%,) that is closed under
the modus ponens (if ϕ ∈ SP(%,) and ϕ → ψ ∈ SP(%,), then ψ ∈ SP(%,)) and
necessitation (if ϕ ∈ SP(%,) then ϕ % > ∈ SP(%,)), contains all instances of tautologies
of propositional logic, all instances of the axiom schemas (A1) to (A6) for SP(%), and all
instances of the axiom schema (A7) (ϕ  ψ)↔ ¬(ψ % ϕ).
Then the following completeness theorem for SP(%,) can be shown in the same way
that we just showed the completeness of IP(%,) using instead the representation result in
Theorem 2.1. It will be used in the completeness proof for IP(%,,♦) in the next section.
Proposition 4.12. For any finite subset p of Prop with L0 being the set of formulas in
L(%,) using only the propositional variables in p, and for any Γ ⊆ L0 that is consistent
relative to SP(%,), there is a probability measure µΓ on ℘(Wp) and a w ∈ Wp such that
Mp, {µΓ}, w  γ for all γ ∈ Γ.
5 The Logic IP(%,,♦)
In this section, we further extend our language with a possibility modal ♦. In the context
of natural language semantics, one proposal for the meaning of “possibly ϕ” in precise
probabilistic models is that ϕ has non-zero probability (Lassiter, 2010, §4.4). In imprecise
probabilistic models, we could require either (a) that all measures in P give ϕ non-zero
probability or (b) that at least some measure in P gives ϕ non-zero probability. We adopt the
weaker interpretation (b) of “possibly ϕ” (not as a proposal in natural language semantics,
but because it suits our technical purposes in the next section). In addition to making claims
about the possibility of factual states of affairs, e.g., “It is possible that it is raining,” we
would like to be able to make claims about the possibility of likelihood relations, e.g., “It is
possible that hail is more likely than lightning tonight.” According to the formal semantics
given below, the latter will be true when there exists a probability measure in P such that
according to that measure hail is more likely than lightning.
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Definition 5.1. The language L(%,,♦) is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ % ϕ) | (ϕ  ϕ) | ♦ϕ
where p ∈ Prop. We define ϕ := ¬♦¬ϕ.
Definition 5.2. We extend the semantics of Definition 4.2 to L(%,,♦) as follows:
• M,P, w  ♦ϕ iff there is a µ ∈ P such that µ(JϕKM,{µ}) 6= 0.
For purely propositional formulas α, ♦α is already expressible in L(%).
Lemma 5.3. Let α, β be propositional formulas. Then:
1. ♦α is equivalent to ¬(⊥ % α);
2. ♦(α % β) and ♦¬(β  α) are both equivalent to ¬(β  α);
3. ♦(β  α) and ♦¬(α % β) are both equivalent to ¬(α % β).
However, ♦ϕ is not in general expressible without ♦.
Example 5.4. The formula ♦((p % q) ∧ (r % s)) is not equivalent to any formula of
L(%,). Consider a propositional model M with four worlds, each making exactly one of
p, q, r, s true. Let P1 be the set of all probability measures on ℘(W ) and P2 the set of all
probability measure µ on ℘(W ) such that it is not the case that both µ(JpKM) ≥ µ(JqKM)
and µ(JrKM) ≥ µ(JsKM). Then for any ϕ ∈ L(%,), M,P1, w  ϕ iff M,P2, w  ϕ, and
yet M,P1, w  ♦((p % q) ∧ (r % s)) while M,P2, w 2 ♦((p % q) ∧ (r % s)).
An important logical fact about the set of valid formulas of L(%,,♦) is that it is not
closed under uniform substitution of arbitrary formulas for propositional variables.
Example 5.5. The formula (p  ⊥)→ ♦(p  ⊥) is valid but
(¬((p % q) ∨ (q % p))  ⊥)→ ♦(¬((p % q) ∨ (q % p))  ⊥)
is not valid, as there is no single probability measure that can make true the non-comparability
formula ¬((p % q) ∨ (q % p)).
While the failure of uniform substitution can complicate efforts to axiomatize a set of
validities (cf. Holliday et al. 2012, 2013), we will completely axiomatize the validities of
L(%,,♦) with the logic IP(%,,♦) defined below.
Definition 5.6. The logic SP(%,,♦) is the smallest subset of L(%,,♦) that is (i) closed
under modus ponens, uniform substitution, and the rule of replacement of provable equiva-
lents, and (ii) contains all theorems of SP(%,) and ♦p↔ (p  ⊥).
The logic IP(%,,♦) is the smallest subset of L(%,,♦) that is (i) closed under modus
ponens, the rule of replacement of provable equivalents, and the rule that if ϕ ∈ SP(%,,♦),
then ϕ ∈ IP(%,,♦), and (ii) contains all instances of the following axiom schemas, where
α and β are propositional:
(C1) (ϕ ∧(ϕ→ ψ))→ ψ;
(C2) ♦>;
(C3) ϕ→ (ϕ % >);
(C4) ♦ϕ→ (♦ϕ % >);
(C5) ϕ↔ (ϕ % >);
(C6) (α % β)↔ (α % β);
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(C7) (α  β)↔ (α  β).
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 5.7 (Soundness and Completeness). For all ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦): ϕ is a theorem of
IP(%,,♦) if and only if ϕ is valid with respect to the class of all imprecise probabilistic
models.
To prove Theorem 5.7, we first show that (1) there is no need for a ♦ to scope over a
♦ and (2) there is no need for a % or  to scope over a ♦. In other words, we will find a
significantly simpler fragment of L(%,,♦), which we call LSimp, such that every formula
in L(%,,♦) is provably equivalent to a formula in LSimp in IP(%,,♦).
Definition 5.8. Define T−♦ : L(%,,♦)→ L(%,) by:
• T−♦(p) = p for all p ∈ Prop;
• T−♦(¬ϕ) = ¬T−♦(ϕ);
• T−♦(ϕ ∧ ψ) = T−♦(ϕ) ∧ T−♦(ψ);
• T−♦(ϕ % ψ) = T−♦(ϕ) % T−♦(ψ);
• T−♦(ϕ  ψ) = T−♦(ϕ)  T−♦(ψ);
• T−♦(♦ϕ) = T−♦(ϕ)  ⊥.
Lemma 5.9. For every ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦), ϕ↔ T−♦(ϕ) is in SP(%,,♦). Moreover, T−♦(ϕ)
uses the same propositional variables as ϕ does.
Proof. A simple induction with repeated use of replacement of equivalents suffices.
Lemma 5.10. In IP(%,,♦), formulas of the form ♦ϕ↔ ¬¬ϕ are theorems. In addition,
 is a normal operator: for any ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦), (ϕ ∧(ϕ→ ψ))→ ψ is in IP(%,,♦),
and whenever ϕ is in IP(%,,♦), so is ϕ.
Proof. To derive ♦ϕ ↔ ¬¬ϕ, it is enough to derive ♦ϕ ↔ ♦¬¬ϕ. But this is clearly
derivable by replacement of equivalents since ♦ϕ↔ ♦ϕ and ϕ↔ ¬¬ϕ are theorems.
Definition 5.11. Let LSimp be the fragment of L(%,,♦) generated from Prop and {♦ϕ |
ϕ ∈ L(%,)} by ¬ and ∧.
In the following, for any p ⊆ Prop, we append [p] to any language to denote the set of
formulas in that language using only variables in p.
Lemma 5.12. For every ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦), there is a T (ϕ) ∈ LSimp such that ϕ ↔ T (ϕ) ∈
IP(%,,♦). Moreover, T (ϕ) and ϕ use the same propositional variables.
Proof. By induction on L(%,,♦). The base case is trivial: we can simply define T (p) = p.
The Boolean cases are also trivial: we can define T (¬ϕ) = ¬T (ϕ) and T (ϕ ∧ ψ) = T (ϕ) ∧
T (ψ). For the ♦ case, define T (♦ϕ) = ♦T−♦(ϕ). To see that ♦ϕ is provably equivalent
to ♦T−♦(ϕ), first note that by Lemma 5.9, ϕ ↔ T−♦(ϕ) ∈ SP(%,,♦). But then (ϕ ↔
T−♦(ϕ)) ∈ IP(%,,♦). By the normality of , we have ♦ϕ↔ ♦T−♦(ϕ) ∈ IP(%,,♦).
To find the appropriate T (ϕ % ψ), given that the required T (ϕ) and T (ψ) in LSimp
have been found, we need to extract all ♦’ed formulas in T (ϕ) % T (ψ) so that they are no
longer in the scope of the main connective % in T (ϕ) % T (ψ). Clearly this can be done by
iteratively using the following claim:
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(*) for any χ ∈ L(%,) and ϕ,ψ ∈ LSimp,
(ϕ % ψ)↔ (♦χ ∧ (ϕ[♦χ/>] % ψ[♦χ/>])) ∨ (¬♦χ ∧ (ϕ[♦χ/⊥] % ψ[♦χ/⊥])))
is in IP(%,,♦).
The claim can be easily proved using (C3) and (C4). Note that since ϕ,ψ are in LSimp,
they are Boolean combinations of Prop and formulas of the form ♦χ where χ ∈ L(%,).
List all the ♦’ed formulas appearing in ϕ or ψ as δ1, δ2, . . . , δn. Then for any f ∈ {0, 1}n,
let δf be
∧n
i=1 ¬f(i)δi where ¬0δi is ¬δi and ¬1δi is simply δi. Moreover, let ϕ[f ] be
ϕ[δ1/>f(1), · · · , δn/>f(n)] and similarly for ψ[f ], where >f(i) = > if f(i) = 1 and >f(i) = ⊥
if f(i) = 0. With these notations, it is not hard to see that by repeatedly applying (*),
ϕ % ψ is provably equivalent to
∨
f∈{0,1}n(δf∧(ϕ[f ] % ψ[f ])) and then also to
∨
f∈{0,1}n(δf∧
(ϕ[f ] % ψ[f ])) since for any f , ϕ[f ] and ψ[f ] are propositional since we have replaced all
the ♦’ed formulas by either > or ⊥ and by axiom (C6) we can add a  there. The formula∨
f∈{0,1}n(δf ∧(ϕ[f ] % ψ[f ])) is the desired T (ϕ % ψ) since it is clearly in LSimp now. The
definition of T (ϕ  ψ) is almost identical: we can simply replace ϕ[f ] % ϕ[f ] by ϕ[f ]  ψ[f ].
In this case, we use (C7) instead.
Now we are ready to prove the soundness and completeness of IP(%,,♦). Soundness is
clear as usual. For completeness, pick an arbitrary γ that is consistent relative to IP(%,,♦),
and let p be the set of propositional variables used in γ. Then take an arbitrary Γ that is
maximally consistent containing γ. Following the standard strategy, let Σ = {(ϕ % >) |
ϕ ∈ Γ, ϕ ∈ L(%,)[p]}. Note that Σ ⊆ L(%,)[p]. Also, Σ must be consistent relative to
SP(%,) since otherwise there are formulas (ϕ1 % >), (ϕ2 % >), . . . , (ϕn % >) in Σ such
that ((ϕ1 % >) ∧ · · · ∧ (ϕn % >))→ ⊥ is in SP(%,). But then by the rules of IP(%,,♦)
and the normality of , we have that ((ϕ1 % >)∧· · ·∧(ϕn % >))→ ⊥ is in IP(%,,♦).
Since ϕ is provably equivalent to (ϕ % >) by (C5), we have that ⊥ is in Γ according
to the maximality of Γ, rendering Γ inconsistent since we have (C2).
Now let D = {Σ ∪ {¬(ϕ % >)} | ¬ϕ ∈ Γ, ϕ ∈ L(%,)[p]}. Note that for each
∆ = Σ ∪ {¬(ϕ % >)} ∈ D, ∆ is also a set of formulas in L(%,)[p]. Moreover, ∆ must
be consistent relative to SP(%,) as well. If not, then since Σ is consistent, we must have
formulas (ϕ1 % >), . . . , (ϕn % >) in Σ such that ((ϕ1 % >) ∧ · · · ∧ (ϕn % >))→ (ϕ % >) ∈
SP(%,). Then by reasoning similar to that above, (¬ϕ % >) and hence ¬ϕ are in Γ
using (C5), rendering Γ inconsistent.
Hence, for each ∆ ∈ D, according to Proposition 4.12, there is a probability measure
µ∆ on ℘(Wp) and a w ∈Wp such that Mp, {µ∆}, w  ∆. Note that since all formulas in ∆
are comparison formulas of the form ϕ % > or its negation, it does not matter what w is.
Hence we have that Mp, {µ∆}  ∆. Take P to be the set {µ∆ | ∆ ∈ D}. Then we are left
only to show that there is a w ∈Wp such that Mp,P, w  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ ∩ L(%,,♦)[p].
Let w0 be the element in Wp = {0, 1}p defined by w0(p) = 1 iff p ∈ Γ for all p ∈ p. Then
we are ready to show the following truth lemma.
Lemma 5.13. For all ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦)[p], Mp,P, w0  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ.
Proof. It is enough to show that for all ϕ ∈ LSimp[p], Mp,P, w0  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ. This is
because for any ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦)[p], according to Lemma 5.12, ϕ ∈ Γ iff T (ϕ) ∈ Γ with
T (ϕ) ∈ LSimp[p]. But then
T (ϕ) ∈ Γ ⇐⇒ Mp,P, w0  T (ϕ) ⇐⇒ Mp,P, w0  ϕ.
The first equivalence holds by the fact that T (ϕ) ∈ LSimp[p] and the truth lemma we will
be showing below in this fragment. The second is by soundness.
We now focus on the fragment LSimp[p]. Since the generating operations of this fragment
are Boolean, the inductive cases are trivial. The atomic case for propositional variables in
p is also trivial by the definition of w0. Hence we are left to show that for any ϕ ∈ {♦ψ |
ψ ∈ L(%,)[p]}, we have ϕ ∈ Γ iff Mp,P, w0  ϕ. In other words, we only need to show
that for all ϕ ∈ L(%,)[p], we have ♦ϕ ∈ Γ iff Mp,P, w0  ♦ϕ.
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• Suppose ♦ϕ 6∈ Γ, so ¬ϕ ∈ Γ. Then (¬ϕ % >) ∈ Σ since ¬ϕ ∈ L(%,)[p], which
means (¬ϕ % >) ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈ D. Then, for any µ∆ ∈ P, Mp, {µ∆}  ¬ϕ % >
since (¬ϕ % >) ∈ ∆, which in turn means that µ∆(JϕKMp,{µ∆}) = 0. This is precisely
the condition for ♦ϕ to be false at Mp,P, w0.
• Suppose ♦ϕ ∈ Γ, so ¬¬ϕ ∈ Γ. Then there is a ∆ such that ¬(¬ϕ % >) ∈ ∆
again because ¬ϕ ∈ L(%,)[p]. For this µ∆ then, Mp, {µ∆} 2 ¬ϕ % >. In other
words, µ∆(JϕKMp,{µ∆}) 6= 0. The existence of this µ∆ ∈ P shows that ♦ϕ is true at
Mp,P, w0.
Given the above truth lemma, Mp,P, w0  γ since γ ∈ Γ and γ ∈ L(%,,♦)[p]. Hence
we have successfully found a model for the arbitrarily chosen consistent γ, completing the
proof of the completeness of IP(%,,♦).
Finally, we briefly comment on the complexity of the consistency problem of IP(%,,♦)
or equivalently the satisfiability problem of L(%,,♦). First, adapting the proof of Theorem
9 in Harrison-Trainor et al. (2017), it is not hard to see that the satisfiability problem for
a conjunction of literals where we take formulas in both Prop and {♦ϕ | ϕ ∈ L(%,)} as
atomic formulas is in NP (note that Theorem 2.6 in Fagin et al. (1990), used in the proof of
Harrison-Trainor et al. (2017), allows strict inequalities). Hence the satisfiability problem
for LSimp is also in NP. Then to see that the satisfiability problem for L(%,,♦) is in NP,
it is enough to show that every ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦) is equivalent to a disjunction of formulas in
LSimp where each disjunct’s length is bounded by O(|ϕ|). In our proof above (for Lemma
5.12), this is done by extracting ♦ from the scope of % and  and eliminating ♦ in the scope
of ♦. Note that the elimination of ♦ in the scope of ♦ can be done before the extraction:
given an input formula ϕ, replace each subformula ♦χ not in the scope of any ♦ by ♦T−♦(χ).
The resulting formula, which we call ϕ′, is clearly at most 4 times longer than ϕ. Then we
only need to run the process of (1) extracting ♦’ed formulas in the scope of % or  and (2)
adding a  to a % formula or a  formula when both arguments to the % or  no longer
contain modal operators. This process, while introducing disjunctions exponentially, only
grows the length of the disjuncts by at most a constant for each extracting operation. The
number of total extracting operations is clearly at most the length of the input formula ϕ′.
Thus, we obtain the following.
Theorem 5.14. The complexity of the satisfiability problem for L(%,,♦) is NP-complete.
6 The Logic IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉)
In this section, we consider a standard notion of updating a set of probability measures on
new evidence (see, e.g., Halpern 2003, p. 81). Given an initial set P of probability measures,
after learning some proposition U ⊆W with certainty, we update the set P to the set
PU = {µ(· | U) : µ ∈ P, µ(U) > 0},
where µ(· | U) is defined by conditionalization as usual: for any V ⊆W , µ(V | U) = µ(V ∩U)µ(U) .
Since we have a formal language containing comparative probability operators, we can
model updating on sentences containing not only factual formulas but also comparative
probability formulas (cf. Yalcin 2011; Moss 2018), as in “it is raining, and it is more likely
that there will be hail than it is that there will be lightning” (r ∧ (h  `)). Intuitively, if
Ann tells Bob that “hail is more likely than lightning,” she is not telling Bob something
about his own epistemic state (which he already knows, in the models of this paper) but
is rather recommending that he update his epistemic state to one according to which hail
is more likely than lightning—which he can do by discarding from his set of measures any
measure according to which hail is not more likely than lightning.3 Our semantics below,
3Another possible interpretation is that there is some objectively correct probability measure, and Ann
is telling Bob a fact about that measure, which he wants his probabilities to ultimately match.
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developed in the style of dynamic epistemic logic (see, e.g., van Ditmarsch et al. 2008; van
Benthem 2011), will allow such updates in response to comparative probability claims.
Definition 6.1. The language L(%,,♦, 〈 〉) is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= α | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | 〈α〉ϕ
for α ∈ L(%,,♦). We read 〈α〉ϕ as “(update with α is possible and) after update with α,
ϕ is the case.”
Definition 6.2. We extend the semantics of Definition 5.2 to L(%,,♦, 〈 〉) as follows:
• M,P, w  〈ϕ〉ψ iff there is a µ ∈ P such that µ(JϕKM,{µ}) 6= 0 and M,Pϕ, w  ψ,
where
Pϕ = {ν(· | JϕKM,{ν}) : ν ∈ P and ν(JϕKM,{ν}) 6= 0}.
The following lemma states how updating with a formula ϕ % ψ, if possible, results in
restricting one’s set of measures to just those that individually satisfy ϕ % ψ.
Lemma 6.3. For any IP model 〈M,P〉 and ϕ,ψ ∈ L(%,,♦), Pϕ%ψ = ∅ or
Pϕ%ψ = {ν ∈ P :M, {ν}  ϕ % ψ}.
Let us see how this framework can be used to formalize the three prisoners scenario from
Example 1.1.
Example 6.4. Let ei and si stand for ‘prisoner i will be executed ’ and ‘the jailer says that
prisoner i will be executed’, respectively. Define a propositional model M = 〈W,V 〉 with
W = {wab, wac, wbc, wcb}
where at wij , prisoner i is the only prisoner who lives and prisoner j is the prisoner who the
jailer says will be executed, so
V (ea) = {wbc, wcb}, V (eb) = {wab, wac, wcb}, V (ec) = {wab, wac, wbc},
V (sb) = {wab, wcb}, V (sc) = {wac, wbc}.
Since prisoner a knows that each prisoner is equally likely to be executed but has no idea
about how the jailer is likely to answer his question about which of b or c will be executed
(except that the jailer is certain to give a true answer), prisoner a’s epistemic state may be
modelled by the following set of probability measures:
P = {µ : µ({wab, wac}) = µ({wbc}) = µ({wcb}) = 1/3}.
Then the following formulas together capture what is distinctive about the puzzle, all coming
out true in this model. First, we can state that each prisoner is equally likely to be spared—
indeed that each has one-third chance (call this formulas α):(⊥ % (ea ∧ eb ∧ ec)) ∧ (((ea ∧ eb) ∨ (ea ∧ ec) ∨ (eb ∧ ec)) % >) ∧ (ea ≈ eb) ∧ (eb ≈ ec). (2)
Given the dynamic operator, we can also express a fact about how a’s uncertainty is affected
upon learning that b is to be executed. After this announcement, a’s credences dilate from
a sharp two-thirds probability to including the possibilities that he is sure to be executed
and that he has merely one-half probability of being executed:
〈sb〉
(
♦(ea % >) ∧ ♦(ea ≈ ¬ea)
)
.
If, however, a first updates with the information that the jailer is following a protocol of
reporting b or reporting c with equal probability in the case that a is to be spared, then
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dilation no longer occurs. In fact, the probability of ea remains at two-thirds, and for
instance the following formula is true:
〈(¬ea ∧ sb) ≈ (¬ea ∧ sc)〉〈sb〉
(
(ea  ec) ∧ (ea  ¬ea) ∧ (>  ea)
)
.
Finally, were a to update with the information that the jailer would certainly announce eb
in case ea were false, then the probabilities of ea, eb, and ec would all remain equally likely:
〈⊥ % (¬ea ∧ sc)〉α,
where α is again the formula above in (2). But after learning that b will be executed, the
probability of ea decreases to one-half:
〈⊥ % (¬ea ∧ sc)〉〈sb〉(ea ≈ ¬ea).
To obtain a complete logic for reasoning about updating sets of probability measures, we
follow the standard “reduction axiom” strategy used in dynamic epistemic logic: identify
a set of valid biconditionals that allow us to reduce any formula containing the dynamic
operators 〈ϕ〉 to an equivalent formula of L(%,,♦) without dynamic operators, which can
then be handled by the complete logic for L(%,,♦).
Definition 6.5. The logic IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉) is the smallest set of L(%,,♦, 〈 〉) formulas that
is (i) closed under modus ponens and the rule of replacement of equivalents, and (ii) contains
all theorems of IP(%,,♦) as well as all instances of the following axiom schemas where
p ∈ Prop and α and β are propositional:
(R0) 〈ϕ〉p↔ (♦ϕ ∧ p);
(R1) 〈ϕ〉♦ψ ↔ ♦〈ϕ〉ψ;
(R2) 〈ϕ〉¬ψ ↔ (♦ϕ ∧ ¬〈ϕ〉ψ);
(R3) 〈ϕ〉(ψ ∧ χ)↔ (〈ϕ〉ψ ∧ 〈ϕ〉χ);
(R4) 〈ϕ〉(α % β)↔ (♦ϕ ∧((ϕ ∧ α) % (ϕ ∧ β)));
(R5) 〈ϕ〉(α  β)↔ (♦ϕ ∧((ϕ  ⊥)→ ((ϕ ∧ α)  (ϕ ∧ β)))).
Example 6.6. In a given model, we may ask if after the agent updates with the information
that it is raining and that hail is more likely than lightning tonight the agent judges that it
is at least as likely that a window will break as it is that the power will go out:
〈r ∧ (h  l)〉(w % p).
This is equivalent, in light of the reduction axiom (R4), to
♦(r ∧ (h  l)) ∧(((r ∧ (h  l)) ∧ w) % ((r ∧ (h  l)) ∧ p)),
which is in turn equivalent to
♦(r ∧ (h  l)) ∧((h  l)→ ((r ∧ w) % (r ∧ p))),
i.e., there is some measure that gives r non-zero probability and gives h greater probability
than l, and every measure that gives h greater probability than l also makes the probability
of w conditional on r at least as great as the probability of p conditional on r.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 6.7 (Soundness and Completeness). For all ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦, 〈 〉): ϕ is a theorem of
IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉) if and only if ϕ is valid with respect to the class of all imprecise probabilistic
models.
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The soundness of IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉) is less trivial than the soundness of the previous systems.
More importantly, we will use its soundness to prove its completeness, similar to the proof
of completeness of other dynamic epistemic logics axiomatized by reduction axioms.
Proposition 6.8. For all ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦, 〈 〉): if ϕ is a theorem of IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉), then ϕ is
valid with respect to the class of all imprecise probabilistic models.
Proof. Clearly it is enough to check the validity of (R0) to (R5).
• For (R0), note that the valuation of p is invariant under the updating.
• For (R1), the key is to treat 〈ϕ〉♦ as a whole, whence the semantics of 〈ϕ〉♦ψ at
M,P, w is that there is a µ ∈ Pϕ such that µ(JψKM,{µ}) > 0. But given the construc-
tion of Pϕ, this is precisely saying that there is a ν ∈ P such that ν(JϕKM,{ν}) > 0
and that, letting µ = ν(· | JϕKM,{ν}), we have µ(JψKM,{µ}) > 0. Now note that
for any ν ∈ P such that JϕKM,{ν} > 0, letting µ = ν(· | JϕKM,{ν}), we haveJ〈ϕ〉ψKM,{ν} = JψKM,{µ} since {ν}ϕ = {µ}. Hence the truth condition of 〈ϕ〉♦ψ
is transformed into the existence of ν ∈ P such that ν(JϕKM,{ν}) > 0 and thatJ〈ϕ〉ψKM,{ν} > 0. But this is precisely the truth condition of ♦〈ϕ〉ψ.
• For (R2), the key insight is that atM,P, w, assuming that there is a ν ∈ P such that
ν(JϕKM,{ν}) > 0, we have:
M,P, w  〈ϕ〉¬ψ ⇐⇒ M,Pϕ, w  ¬ψ
⇐⇒ M,Pϕ, w 6 ψ
⇐⇒ M,P, w  ¬〈ϕ〉ψ.
• For (R3), the idea is similar to the above.
• For (R4), it is enough to observe the following chain of equivalences assuming that
there is a ν ∈ P such that ν(JϕKM,{ν}) > 0:
M,P, w  〈ϕ〉(α % β) ⇐⇒ M,Pϕ, w  α % β
⇐⇒ ∀µ ∈ Pϕ, µ(JαKM,Pϕ) ≥ µ(JβKM,Pϕ)
⇐⇒ ∀µ ∈ Pϕ, µ(V (α)) ≥ µ(V (β))
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P such that ν(JϕKM,{ν}) > 0,
ν(V (α) | JϕKM,{ν}) ≥ ν(V (β) | JϕKM,{ν})
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P such that ν(JϕKM,{ν}) > 0,
ν(V (α) ∩ JϕKM,{ν}) ≥ ν(V (β) ∩ JϕKM,{ν})
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P, ν(V (α) ∩ JϕKM,{ν}) ≥ ν(V (β) ∩ JϕKM,{ν})
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P,M, {ν}  (ϕ ∧ α) % (ϕ ∧ β)
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P, ν(J(ϕ ∧ α) % (ϕ ∧ β)KM,{ν}) = 1
⇐⇒ M,P, w  ((ϕ ∧ α) % (ϕ ∧ β)).
Note that the last three equivalences extensively use the fact that a Boolean combina-
tion of a comparison formulas is true at a world if and only if it is true at all worlds.
The sixth equivalence is true because when ν(JϕKM,{ν}) = 0, it trivially holds that
ν(V (α) ∩ JϕKM,{ν}) ≥ ν(V (β) ∩ JϕKM,{ν}).
• For (R5), the strategy is the same—it is enough to observe the following chain of
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equivalences assuming that there is a ν ∈ P such that ν(JϕKM,{ν}) > 0:
M,P, w  〈ϕ〉(α  β) ⇐⇒ M,Pϕ, w  α  β
⇐⇒ ∀µ ∈ Pϕ, µ(JαKM,Pϕ) > µ(JβKM,Pϕ)
⇐⇒ ∀µ ∈ Pϕ, µ(V (α)) > µ(V (β))
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P such that ν(JϕKM,{ν}) > 0,
ν(V (α) | JϕKM,{ν}) > ν(V (β) | JϕKM,{ν})
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P such that ν(JϕKM,{ν}) > 0,
ν(V (α) ∩ JϕKM,{ν}) > ν(V (β) ∩ JϕKM,{ν})
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P, if M, {ν}  ϕ  ⊥ then M, {ν}  (ϕ ∧ α)  (ϕ ∧ β)
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P,M, {ν}  (ϕ  ⊥)→ ((ϕ ∧ α)  (ϕ ∧ β))
⇐⇒ ∀ν ∈ P, ν(J(ϕ  ⊥)→ ((ϕ ∧ α)  (ϕ ∧ β))KM,{ν}) = 1
⇐⇒ M,P, w  ((ϕ  ⊥)→ ((ϕ ∧ α)  (ϕ ∧ β))).
Again, the last four equivalences extensively use the fact that a Boolean combination
of comparison formulas is true at a world if and only if it is true at all worlds.
For completeness, we first show that the axioms allow us to provably-equivalently reduce
any formula in L(%,,♦, 〈 〉) to a fragment LSimpd1 that is even simpler than the fragment
LSimp: the comparison formulas in the scope of any ♦ must not have nested comparison.
Definition 6.9. Let LBool be the set of propositional formulas. In other words, this is the
fragment generated from Prop by ¬ and ∧.
Let LCompd1 be the fragment of L(%,) with no nesting of % and . In other words,
this is the fragment generated from Prop and {(α % β), (α  β) | α, β ∈ LBool} by ¬ and ∧.
Finally, let LSimpd1 be the fragment of L(%,,♦) generated from Prop and {♦ϕ | ϕ ∈
LCompd1} by ¬ and ∧.
Lemma 6.10. For every ϕ ∈ L(%,), there is a TCompd1(ϕ) ∈ LCompd1 such that ϕ ↔
TCompd1(ϕ) ∈ IP(%,). Moreover, ϕ and TCompd1(ϕ) use the same propositional variables.
Proof. We use a standard argument for extracting comparisons embedded in comparions.
Formally, an induction over L(%,) is needed. The base case and the inductive cases for
¬ and ∧ are trivial as we can simply define TCompd1(p) = p, TCompd1(¬ϕ) = ¬TCompd1(ϕ),
and TCompd1(ϕ ∧ ψ) = TCompd1(ϕ) ∧ TCompd1(ψ).
For the non-trivial cases for % and , we only need the following: for any α, β ∈ LBool
and ϕ,ψ ∈ LCompd1, the following are in IP(%,):
(ϕ % ψ)↔ (((α % β) ∧ (ϕ[α % β/>] % ψ[α % β/>])) ∨ (¬(α % β) ∧ (ϕ[α % β/⊥] % ψ[α % β/⊥])));
(ϕ % ψ)↔ (((α  β) ∧ (ϕ[α % β/>] % ψ[α % β/>])) ∨ (¬(α  β) ∧ (ϕ[α % β/⊥] % ψ[α % β/⊥])));
(ϕ  ψ)↔ (((α % β) ∧ (ϕ[α % β/>]  ψ[α % β/>])) ∨ (¬(α % β) ∧ (ϕ[α % β/⊥]  ψ[α % β/⊥])));
(ϕ  ψ)↔ (((α  β) ∧ (ϕ[α % β/>]  ψ[α % β/>])) ∨ (¬(α  β) ∧ (ϕ[α % β/⊥]  ψ[α % β/⊥]))).
They are proven mainly by (B7) to (B10). The key idea is to first derive the following:
(α % β)→ ((ϕ↔ ϕ[α % β/>]) % >);
¬(α % β)→ ((ϕ↔ ϕ[α % β/⊥]) % >);
(α  β)→ ((ϕ↔ ϕ[α  β/>]) % >);
¬(α  β)→ ((ϕ↔ ϕ[α  β/⊥]) % >).
Together with ((ϕ ↔ ψ) % >) → ((ϕ % χ) ↔ (ψ % χ)) and ((ϕ ↔ ψ) % >) → ((ϕ  χ) ↔
(ψ  χ)), the required equivalences can easily be derived.
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Proposition 6.11. For every ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦) there is a TSimpd1(ϕ) ∈ LSimpd1 such that
ϕ↔ TSimpd1(ϕ) is in IP(%,,♦).
Proof. The result of replacing all ♦χ in TSimp(ϕ) by ♦TCompd1(χ) is the desired TSimpd1(ϕ).
Proposition 6.12. For every ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦, 〈 〉) there is a TSimpd1(ϕ) ∈ LSimpd1 such that
ϕ↔ TSimpd1(ϕ) is in IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉).
Proof. Given Proposition 6.11 and the rule of replacement of equivalents, clearly we only
need to show that there is a TSimpd1(〈ϕ〉ψ) that is provably equivalent to 〈ϕ〉ψ in IP(%
,,♦, 〈 〉) where ϕ,ψ are in LSimpd1. By repeated use of (R1) to (R3) and the rule of
replacement of equivalents, obviously we can push the 〈ϕ〉 into ψ over Boolean connectives
and ♦ and obtain a Boolean combination of formulas of the form 〈ϕ〉p or of the form
〈ϕ〉(α % β) or 〈ϕ〉(α  β) since in LSimpd1, % and  only scope over propositional formulas.
All three kinds of formulas can be replaced by formulas in L(%,,♦) provably equivalently.
Then we apply TSimpd1 again to finish off (to eliminate any ♦’s appearing inside ♦’s).
With the above reduction method, the completeness of IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉) follows.
Proposition 6.13. For all ϕ ∈ L(%,,♦, 〈 〉): if ϕ is valid with respect to the class of all
imprecise probabilistic models, then ϕ is a theorem of IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉).
Proof. Let ϕ be any valid formula in L(%,,♦, 〈 〉). Then by the soundness of IP(%,
,♦, 〈 〉) and the fact that ϕ ↔ TSimpd1(ϕ) ∈ IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉), TSimpd1(ϕ) is also valid. But
TSimpd1(ϕ) ∈ LSimpd1 ⊆ L(,,♦). By the completeness of IP(%,,♦), TSimpd1(ϕ) ∈ IP(%
,,♦). By the definition of IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉), it contains all theorems of IP(%,,♦). Hence
TSimpd1(ϕ) is in IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉). Then by Boolean reasoning, ϕ is in IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉).
Although the reduction axioms for L(%,,♦, 〈 〉) allow us to reduce the satisfiability
problem for L(%,,♦, 〈 〉) to that for L(%,,♦), which is in NP (Theorem 5.14), it does
not immediately follow that the satisfiability problem for L(%,,♦, 〈 〉) is in NP, due to the
blowup in the length of formulas during the reduction process. A similar obstacle occurs
in the case of the simplest dynamic epistemic logic (public announcement logic), in which
case a solution is to use a satisfiability-preserving reduction with only polynomial blowup
instead of the standard validity-preserving reduction with exponential blowup (Lutz 2006).
Whether this or other techniques apply to L(%,,♦, 〈 〉) we leave as an open problem.
Problem 6.14. Determine the complexity of the satisfiability problem for L(%,,♦, 〈 〉).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated a hierarchy of languages and matching complete logics
for imprecise comparative probabilistic reasoning:
L(%) ⊆ L(%,) ⊆ L(%,,♦) ⊆ L(%,,♦, 〈 〉);
IP(%) ⊆ IP(%,) ⊆ IP(%,,♦) ⊆ IP(%,,♦, 〈 〉).
All of these logics have straightforward extensions to the multi-agent setting, in which each
agent i has their own comparative probability relations %i and i, allowing us to formalize
statements such as “Ann judges it more likely than not that Bob thinks hail is more likely
than lightning”: (h b l) a ¬(h b l). A multi-agent version of the language L(%)
was already studied in Alon and Heifetz (2014). Generalizing the other languages in this
paper to the multi-agent setting presents no major challenges, although the complexity of
the resulting multi-agent logics goes beyond that of the single-agent versions, just as the
complexity of the basic epistemic logic S5 jumps from NP to PSPACE when moving from
the single-agent to multi-agent setting (see Halpern and Moses 1992).
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Further extensions to the language are natural to consider, such as adding comparative
conditional probability formulas (ϕ | ψ) % (α | β) (resp. (ϕ | ψ)  (α | β)) expressing
that the conditional probability of ϕ given ψ is at least as great as (resp. greater than)
the conditional probability of α given β for every measure in one’s set of measures, which
is not expressible in the languages of this paper (see Luce 1968). For precise probabilistic
models, such a quarternary operator is investigated in, e.g., Domotor 1969, § 2.6 and Suppes
and Zanotti 1982 (and recently in Hawthorne 2016 using so-called Popper functions), but
the interpretation in imprecise probabilistic models seems yet to be explored. Allowing
inequalities of probabilistic products (ϕ×ψ) % (α×β) would allow even greater expressivity
(such an extension in the precise case is also considered in Domotor 1969, §2.4).
More generally, the systems in this paper are part of a much broader hierarchy of prob-
abilistic languages, ranging from the very simple L(%) all the way to highly expressive
probabilistic languages encompassing full quantified real number arithmetic (Fagin et al.,
1990; Ognjanovic´ et al., 2016). In addition to their inherent theoretical interest, proba-
bilistic logics have emerged as a foundational tool for many central computational tasks,
from core knowledge representation (Russell, 2015), to reasoning about strategic interaction
(Dekel and Siniscalchi, 2015; van Benthem and Klein, 2019), to causal inference (witness do-
calculus, which is built on top of a probability calculus; see, e.g., Pearl 2009; Hyttinen et al.
2014; Ibeling and Icard 2020). Furthermore, applications in these contexts have motivated
some of the very systems presented here (e.g., Alon and Heifetz 2014). Understanding the
capacities and limitations of such systems may well be an important step toward further
integration of explicit probabilistic tools in these and other domains.
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